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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

LOGIC AS THE SCIENCE OF PURE CONCEPT. By *Benedetto Croce*. Translated from the Italian by *Douglas Ainslie, B.A. (Oxon.), M.R.A.S.* London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1917. Pp. xxxiv, 606. Price 14s. net.

This volume is the second of a series of four by Croce on the philosophy of the spirit—the other three being: *Esthetic as the Science of Expression and General Linguistic*; *Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic*; and *The Theory and History of History*. The last has not yet been published; the other three, including the volume under present consideration, have been translated into English by Mr. Ainslie.

The book is divided into four parts: I. The Pure Concept, the Individual Judgment, and the *a priori* Logical Synthesis; II. Philosophy, History, and the Natural and Mathematical Sciences; III. Error; IV. Historical Retrospect. The first two parts are more important than the last two, considered as expositions of the author's general attitude.

According to Croce, logic is the science of pure concept—pure as distinguished from the fictitious concept, or pseudo-concept. The pure concept is characterized by three properties: (a) universality and transcendence, (b) concreteness—i. e., applicability to the actual world, (c) expression—which is the quality of being enunciated in some form of language, not vocal necessarily. Examples of pure concepts are beauty, quality, final cause. Pseudo-concepts are such as lack one or more of these properties; more particularly, they are either abstract, that is, lack instances (e. g., the concept *triangle*), or they are mere class-names, lacking transcendence and universality (e. g., the concept *house*, which, being directly representative of its object, lacks a special content of its own and is of limited application). Pure concepts include their opposites—thus “beauty is such because it has within it ugliness” (p. 97); “if God had not Satan in Himself, He would be like food without salt” (p. 98). But when taken thus complete, the concepts are distinct from one another. The expression of the pure concept constitutes the judgment of definition; definition, in this instance, is true absolutely, becoming arbitrary when the content of the judgment is a pseudo-concept, as is the case with mathematical definitions.

Parallel with the judgment of definition we have the individual judgment, like “Peter is good,” where the subject is a representation and the predicate a pure concept. An individual judgment implies the existence of its subject, existence being one of the attributes of the latter. Corresponding to pseudo-

concepts, we have pseudo-judgments, namely, judgments of classification and of enumeration.

Now, in relation to these distinctions of concept and judgment, distinctions of knowledge appear. There is thus philosophy, which is the thought of the pure concept; there is history, i. e., the knowledge expressed through individual judgments. These two are the only legitimate forms of theory; in fact, they are ultimately identical—the individual judgment is conceptual as well as perceptual in that it contains a predicate, and on the other hand, the judgment of definition is historical as well as universal, for it always is an answer to a question individually conditioned, and the philosopher, in the standpoint that he assumes, is influenced by his temperament and the historical conditions of his time. The argument does not seem very cogent at this point; the historical conditions just mentioned concern the philosopher himself and in no way are constituents of the judgment of definition as such. There are two other forms of knowledge, natural science, depending upon group-names and using the method of classification, and mathematics, which receives expression in abstract judgments. Both of these are illegitimate forms of knowledge, for they depend on pseudo-concepts, in fact they are not forms of knowledge at all, strictly speaking, but really forms of action.

In further chapters the author takes up the topic of error, its nature and its varieties. His view of religion is of special interest; religion is according to him that form of error which consists in the "affirmation of the universal as mere representation," i. e., in the expression of a general character like "universe" through something particular, such as "personal God"; religion is false philosophy, and philosophy is the true religion. The author is particularly severe on what he regards as the error of formal and symbolic logic; he accuses them both of basing their analysis of the concept on its verbal form, pretending to "obtain thought in words." Croce almost betrays a bias against mathematics as when he says of it: "It is a devastation, a mutilation, a scourge, penetrating into the actual world, in which it has no part" (p. 370).

Croce exhibits historical affinities with Kant, whose doctrine of the logical *a priori* synthesis he regards as a philosophical discovery of the highest importance, with Hegel, particularly as concerns the unity of opposites in a concept, and with Vico, whom he admires for the importance which he (Vico) attached to the historical point of view. In his doctrine of the concreteness of the universal, our author comes very close to Bosanquet and others of the same school. The style of the work is very vivid and flowing but it suffers in its excessive dependence on metaphors and the symbolic modes of expression, in general. Speaking of the value of philosophy, he says some very good things; thus (p. 499), "Philosophy brings consolation in its own kingdom, putting error to flight...; but man is not thought alone... philosophy has no handkerchief to dry all the tears that man sheds." Croce denies that philosophy and logic are only for the expert and that they are absolutely distinct from the field of common sense: "As the hero is not outside humanity, but is he in whom the soul of the people is concentrated and made powerful, so poetry, philosophy, science, and history, aristocratically circumscribed, are the most conspicuous manifestations attained by the elementary forms of acquaintance themselves" (p. 253). And, in a vigorous statement of the view that the philosophic thinker never attains finality, he says: "To any philosopher,

as to any poet, the only works of his own that bring true satisfaction are those that he has still to do" (p. 317).

Perhaps the most striking feature of the book is the relegation of natural science and mathematics from the field of theory to that of action. This attitude is based upon the view that the concepts of science and mathematics are fictitious. But to come to a specific point, it is not wholly clear why a concept like "house" should not be regarded as possessing universality; having a definite meaning, like all other concepts, it applies to a definite set of objects, but the number of these is not limited, for the concept house applies to all possible, as well as actual, houses. And in general, instead of adopting a definition of science and mathematics which is also an evaluation of them, would it not have been more desirable to distinguish them from philosophy and history by reference not to the mode of knowledge but to the subject-matter—to define, say, history, as dealing with the particular and changing elements and science with the constant and universal elements of reality? Such a definition would not prejudice the question of the cognitive value of that which it defines and indeed would allow full scope for the claims which, undeniably, both science and mathematics make upon the intellect.

The point of view in the author's treatment of logic is thoroughly philosophical and systematic. Assertions in this volume are defended by references to theses expounded and adopted in the author's other works, and theses that are purely metaphysical in purport. The argument moves with that ease—and we may add, dogmatism, on some occasions—which come from the consciousness that any given stage in the argument is completely bound up with and determined by the stages already covered.

In most forms of knowledge, there have been two stages, the philosophical and the scientific, the latter following upon the heels of the former; thus, physics, psychology, chemistry, have all been "philosophies" before, but are sciences at the present. The same movement has appeared in the growth of logical thinking. Hegel is the preeminent representative of the purely philosophical approach to logic, whereas the present tendency to identify logic with mathematics represents the gradual development of logic into an exact science. Croce is a self-conscious upholder of the philosophical approach to logic, and the present work constitutes a forceful, clear, and on the whole, notable contribution to the treatment of logic as a philosophical study. Δ

A DEFENCE OF IDEALISM: SOME QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS. By *May Sinclair*. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917. Price, 12s. net.

This entertaining volume of essays opens with a chapter on the Pan-Psychism of Samuel Butler. Miss Sinclair traces out Butler's destruction of the theory of "personal identity," and discusses his view that habit and instinct are but memory and that both presuppose knowledge and volition on the part of the individual that displays them. Butler's theories and those of the new psycho-analytic school stand in an interesting relation. Butler, of course, held that the only sane and perfect life is the unconscious life. The psycho-analysts, on the other hand, seem to assume that we must live consciously if we would live well. An interesting account is given of the conceptions made use of by the psycho-analysts and it is shown that Butler's work helps to an